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In the absence of such a rule, the argument supporting a tacit waiver of immunit 2 in
such situations is weak." All international instruments on the subject require the express
consent of the interested party for submitting to the jurisdiction of the forum state. At-
tempts to find such implied consent in multilateral treaties have been summarily repulsed,
even under the United States' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' The adoption of this contro-
versial waiver argument in Voiotia can be attributed only to an acute case ofjudicial activism.
The Court's decision to invest with its authority what can at best be described as an
emerging rule of international law will undoubtedly have repercussions. Indeed, the final
act of the drama has yet to be played out. Invoking the requirement for an effective remedy
as a necessary component of a fair trial under Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, the claimants have already attempted to enforce this decision against
such emanations of the German state as the Goethe InstitutAthen and the German Archae-
ological School. Recourse to the European Court of Human Rights is also being discussed.5
MARIA GAVOUNELI, Hellenic Institute of International & Foreign Law
ILIAS BANTEKAS, University of Westminster
Asylum-right ofparent to represent child-effect ofparent's residence in Cuba-administrative law-
judicial review of immigration decision
GONZALEZEXREL. GONZALEZV. RENO. 212 F.3d 1338, rehearingdenied, 215 F.3d 1243, certiorari
denied, 120 S.Ct. 2737 (2000).
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, June 1, 2000.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit (per Edmondson,
J.) upheld a district court decision' dismissing the plaintiff Elidn Gonzdlez's suit against the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which had denied the validity of asylum
applications filed for him and in his name. Elidn Gonz~1ez is a six-year-old boy whose father
in Cuba-his sole surviving parent-opposed any such application. Relying primarily on the
criteria forjudicial review set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Germany, 16 MICH.J. INT'L L. 403 (1995); see alsoJordanJ. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extratenitorial Acts of
Terrorism and NonimmunityforForeign Violators of lnternational Law Under the ESIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA.
J. INT'L L. 191,193 (1983).
51 The argument was, however, decisively rejected in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428 (1989), Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir., 1994), and Siderman deBlakev. Republic
of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Christian Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims in Instances
of Grave Human Rights Violations: The Position Under General International Law, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL 1, 16-18 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999).
5 See Thora A. Johnson, A Violation ofJus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver oflmmunity Under theFederal Sovereign
Immunities Act, 19 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 259 (1995); Andrea Bianchi, Overcoming the Hurdle of Statelmmunity in
theDomesticEnforcement of InternationalHuman Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNAT[ONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC
COURTS, supra note 44, at 405, 422-24.
"' See Magdalini Karagiannakis, State Immunity and Fundamental Human Rights, 11 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 9, 20-21
(1998);Juergen Br6hmer, Diplomaticlmmunity, Head of State Immunity, State Immunity: Misconceptions of a Notorious
Human Rights Violator, 12 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 361, 363-66 (1999).
' See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Von Dardel v. USSR, 736
F.Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The notion of implied consent was severely criticized by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in
ArgentineRepublicv. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442-43. For an overview, seeJUERGENBR6HIER, STATE
IMMUNITYAND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 190-96 (1997).
" Three similar cases are currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights. See McElhinney v.
Ireland and United Kingdom, Admissibility, App. No. 31253/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 9, 2000), Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, Admissibility, App. No. 35763/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R, Mar. 1, 2000); Fogarty v. United Kingdom, Ad-
missibility, App. No. 37112/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 1, 2000). The decisions are obtainable from <http://
www.echr.coe.int>.
' Gonzalez ex rel Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 212 F.3d 1338 (2000) [hereinafter
Gonzlez district court decision]. The Ellin GonzAlez case is discussed in Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice
of the United States, 94 AJIL 516 (2000).
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Inc.,2 the court of appeals ruled that the INS had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously and
had not abused its discretion. "The Court neither approves nor disapproves of the INS's
decision to reject the asylum applications filed on Plaintiff's behalf, but the INS decision did
not contradict" the statute.' Specifically, the court found that the INS, after intensive
interviews with the boy's father, was properly "exercising its gap-filling discretion"4 on the
basis of governing law, procedures, and guidelines when it determined:
(1) six-year-old children lack the capacity to sign and to submit personally an appli-
cation for asylum;
(2) ... six-year-old children must be represented by an adult in immigration matters;
(3) absent special circumstances,5 the only proper adult to represent a six-year-old child
is the child's parent, even when the parent is not in this country; and,
(4) that the parent lives in a communist-totalitarian state (such as Cuba), in and of itself,
does not constitute a special circumstance requiring the selection of a non-parental repre-
6sentative.
In addition, the court gave short shrift to a constitutional due process claim, reaffirming
the plenary powers of Congress and the executive branch in immigration matters and holding
that aliens seeking admission had only the statutory rights given them by Congress. 7 The
court also upheld the district court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem, finding that the
child, as plaintiff, had been "ably represented in district court by his next friend"s -his pa-
ternal great-uncle, L~zaro Gonzgez-"aided by a troop of seasoned lawyers."9 In so ruling,
the court of appeals, like the district court, dismissed the statutory asylum claim. So ended,
with a relatively prosaic and uncomplicated ruling, a case that drew intense domestic and
international attention and political comment.
Around November 22,1999, Elizabeth Gonzg1ez took her then five-year-old son Eliln and
joined her boyfriend-a professional smuggler-and eleven others on a ricketyboat headed
from Cuba to South Florida. She did so without the knowledge of the Juan Miguel Gonzdlez,
the boy's father and her former husband. The members of the group intended, like so many
thousands before them, to avail themselves of the Cuban Adjustment Act." The act permits
any Cuban arriving" in the United States legally or illegally to be admitted or paroled into
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Gonzalez ex reL Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Gonzlez appeal].
4 Id. at 1349.
s [Author's note: the circuit court wrote:
Under the INS policy, a substantial conflict ofinterest between the parentand the child may require or allow
another adult to speak for the child on immigration matters. In considering whether a substantial conflict
of interest exists, the INS considers the potential merits of a child's asylum claim. If the child would have an
exceedingly strong case for asylum, the parent's unwillingness to seek asylum on that child's behalf may
indicate, under the INS policy, that the parent is not representing adequately the child's interests.
Id. at 1352 n.21.]
6 Id. at 1349-50 (footnote omitted).
'"Plaintiff's due process claim lacks merit and does not warrant extended discussion. SeeJean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957,968(11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ('Aliens seeking admission to the United States... have no constitutional
rights with regard to their applications .... .')." Id. at 1346 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1346 n.7. Indeed.
0 Cuban Refugees: Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat 1161 (1966), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-571,
90 Stat. 2706 (1976) & Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(i), 94 Stat. 108 (1980), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. §1255 note (1994)
[hereinafter CAA].
" Formostofthe last34years, "arrival" under the CAAwas understood to mean "reaching U.S.waters." Since 1994,
however, when a loose set of U.S.-Cuba migration accords was reached, "arrival" has meant "arrival on shore." See
Joint Communiqu6 Between U.S. and Republic of Cuba, Sept. 9,1994,71 Interp. ReL 1236 (Sept. 12,1994), 1994
WL 621517 (treaty). This move from a so-called wet-foot to a dry-foot requirement has led to violent encounters
between U.S. Coast Guard vessels attempting to rescue (and possibly repatriate) U.S.-bound Cubans floundering
at sea and the Cuban "rafters" (many of whom are seasoned professional smugglers) intent on reaching shore
without being intercepted.
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the country, to be authorized to work, and, after one year's presence, to apply for perma-
nent resident status (and thereby to obtain a Green Card). The act thus exempts Cubans
from those provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) that require an indi-
vidualized claim of asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution, 12 and that, unless
such a claim is upheld, render excludable and deportable all aliens arriving in the United
States illegally, be it surreptitiously, outside a designated port of entry, orwithoutvalid docu-
mentation such as a passport and entry visa.
After their boat sank, Elizabeth Gonzdilez and most of the others on board perished, but
Elidn survived and was rescued three miles out at sea on November 25, 1999.3 Medical staff
at the Florida hospital where Elidn was taken phoned his father in Cuba and learned from
him that the boy had distant relatives in Miami. Later that day, the INS deferred inspection
of Eli~in-who, having not reached shore, was still in need of inspection-temporarily paroled
him, instead, into the country, and released him to be lodged in Miami with iUzaro Gonzdlez
and his immediate family. As in all parole situations, legal custody of the parolee remained
exclusively in the hands of the U.S. attorney general. 4 The party providing the lodging and
care of a parolee gains no custody rights whatsoever. This point sometimes eluded Lzaro's
attorneys, 5 the press, 6 and even one local judge, whose ill-founded decision abetted the
misrepresentation of Elin's custody status.17
Two days after Eli~in's arrival in Florida, Juan Miguel Gonzdlez sent a letter to the Cuban
Foreign Ministry protesting that his son "was taken out of [Cuba] in an illegal manner and
12 See infra note 21.
"Two adults also survived. They have remained in the United States, been inspected, and become beneficiaries
of the CAA.
" The statute makes clear that parole is not entry into the country--"shall not be regarded as an admission of
the aien"--and provides that the attorney general may offer it "temporarily under such conditions as he may
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C.
§1182 (d) (5). The alien is "still in theory of law at the boundary line and ha[s] gained no foothold in the United
States." Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925). Thus, from the outset and throughout, the Gonzlez family in
Miami was no more than an innkeeper at the whim of attorney general.
5 As early as December 15, 1999-well before the first Florida state court decision on the matter (see infra note
17)-the attorneys claiming to represent Elin submitted filings to the INS in which they claimed to represent
Elidn "by direct consent as well as through the consent ofLzaro Gonzglez, Elifn's custodian, who is currently his
legal guardian in the United States." INS Form G-28, "Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Repre-
sentative" (filed by attorneys ofLazaro Gonzlez, Dec. 15, 1999), quoted in Memorandum from Bo Cooper, General
Counsel, INS, to Doris Meissner, Commissioner (January3, 2000) [hereinafter Cooper memorandum], in Defendants'
Notice of Filing Record and Exhibits, Gonzilez district court decision, supranote 1, at5, 7 (No. 00-206-CIV-MOORE)
[hereinafter Defendants' Notice of Filing]. For trained immigration and family lawyers to make such a claim in an
official filing is inexplicable. In this connection, there may have been a potential conflict of interest between the
attorneys' duties to Lizaro and those to Elign. See Cooper Memorandum, in Defendants' Notice of Filing at 7.
"6 TheMiami Herald, for example-both in its editorials and in some of its news coverage-consistently referred
to Elidn throughout the entire seven-month period as being in the "custody" and not, for example, in the "care"
of his great-uncle. Reporters for the Herald acknowledge that this editorial decision was made in order to bolster
the cause of the Miami relatives. See, e.g., Andres Viglucci &Jay Weaver, Elian's Relatives Have One Chance to Stave
Off His Repatriation to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 29, 2000 (Miami relatives "on the brink of losing custody of the
boy to U.S. immigration authorities").17 OnJan. 10, 2000,Judge Rosalie Rodriguez of the family division of the Florida circuit court in Miami granted
a temporary protective order purporting to take custody from Elidn's father,Juan Miguel GonzAlez, and lodging
it in the great-uncle, Ldzaro, whom she incorrectly described as having been granted custody by the INS. See
Temporary Protective Order, Gonzalezv. Gonzalez-Quintana, No. 00-00479-FC-29 (Fla. 11 th Cir. Ct.Jan. 10, 2000)
(granting "Petitioner's Verified EmergencyEx-Parte Petition for Interim Order"). That decision was roundly criti-
cized by the familyand immigration bar.Judge Bailey, chiefjudge of the family court, assumed the case afterJudge
Rodriguezwas forced to withdrawbecause ofthe notunrelated campaign-finance indictment pending against her.
Judge Bailey dismissed the custody case with prejudice and a stern rebuke, explaining that the state court was
preempted and had no jurisdiction, and that the petitioner, LIzaro, in any event lacked standing to sue under the
Florida statute upon whichJudge Rodriguez had rested her faulty ruling. Seeln reLazaro Gonzalez, No. 00-00479-
FC-28 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 13, 2000).
In the subsequent Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1171 (emphasis added),Judge Moore was
careful to write that the INS had granted Elidn "a temporary deferral of his inspection and placed him in the care
of his paternal great uncle."
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without [his] consent."8 The letter was forwarded to the U.S. interests section" in Havana
that same day. In a letter to the father dated December 8,1999, INS District Director Robert
Wallis "outlined the documentation required by the INS in order to release" Elidn to his
father.2' The letter indicated, moreover, that the father would need to be interviewed by
U.S. government officials.
While the father's request became captive to a strained U.S.-Cuba foreign relations
process, Eli~n's relatives in Miami and the organizations backing them became active in the
legal and public-relations arenas. Hearing of the exchange of letters, Elidn's great-uncle
LUzaro signed and filed an asylum application for Elidn on December 10. The application
alleged that the boy, now turned six, would be persecuted in Cuba on the basis of a political
opinion or his membership in a particular social group.2' Shortly thereafter, an identical
petition was filed bearing Elidn's block-print "signature."22 OnJanuary 12, 2000, following
a local family courtjudge's ruling-subsequently vacated with prejudice-that purported to
remove custody from the father and to give temporary custody of Elidn to Lizaro,25 Lzaro
filed a third asylum application on Elidn's behalf.
24
Elign's father was interviewed extensively by INS and State Department officials at safe
locations in Cuba beginning on December 13, 1999. He expressed the view, later quoted by
both the district court and court of appeals, that: "I'm very grateful that [Elidn] received
immediate medical assistance, but he should be returned to me and my family.... As for
him to get asylum, I am not allowing him to stay or claim any type of petition; he should be
returned immediately to me."25 Despite the INS's conclusion that the father was sincere, was
speaking free of coercion, and enjoyed a close and responsible relationship with his son,
further interviews were undertaken on December 31 in response to concerns expressed by
Lizaro's attorneys and by supporters in Miami that the father's statements were coerced, not
credible, and not fatherly. In the view of the INS, these additional interviews confirmed the
father's free volition, sincerity, and fatherliness.26
The INS concluded its investigations with a lengthy memorandum datedJanuary 3, 2000,
from its general counsel, Bo Cooper, to INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, who incorpo-
rated the memorandum's findings into her announcement ofJanuary 5 that Eli6n's father
had the exclusive right to speak for him in immigration matters and that the INS would be
'
8 Gonzilez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1171.
1 The United States and Cuba, which do not have diplomatic relations with one another, maintain com-
munication through interests sections that are organized under the auspices of the Swiss Embassies in Havana and
Washington, D.C.
" The timing of the father's letter is explained more clearly in the Gonzglez district court decision, supra note 1,
at 1171, than in the GonzJez appeal, supra note 3, at 1345.
1 Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1171. Consistent with international agreements-in
particular, Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150-U.S.
law defines an asylee as a refugee who has landed in or at the border of the United States and who can document
personally entertaining a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a) (42) (A). The seminal case remains INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
22 See GonzHez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1171.
' See supra note 17. In a letter to the parties datedJanuary 12, Attorney GeneralJanet Reno made clear that
Eli~in, as a parolee, was in her exclusive custody, that neither she nor the INS was, or could be, a party to a local
family court decision such as the one just issued, and that the decision had absolutely no effect on the process
underway. This same letter also effectively invited the family in Miami to litigate the issues in federal court. In part,
this letter served to reiterate the federal monopoly over immigration matters, but it was obviously construed by
the family as an offer to litigate what was, in fact, a closed matter. See Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney
General, to Spencer Eig, Roger Bernstein, and Linda Osberg-Braun (Jan. 12, 2000), in Defendants' Notice of
Filing, supra note 15, at 25 [hereinafter Reno letter], excerpted in Gonz4lez district court decision, supra note 1, at
1174-75. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24 See Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1175.
22 Gonzlez appeal, supra note 3, at 1345; Gonz,.lez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1172.
21 SeeDeclaration ofSilma L. Dimmel [lead INS interviewer], in Defendants' Notice of Filing, supranote 15, at
229; Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1172-73.
2001]
THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
returning the boy to Cuba, pursuant to his father's wishes.2 7 In the INS's view, which was
subsequently endorsed by both the district court and court of appeals, there was "no diver-
gence of interest between the father and the child with respect to EliMn's asylum application
which warrants interference with the father's parental authority." In addition, "there ap-
pear [ed] to be no objective basis for a valid claim for asylum or protection"2 under either
the INA or the Convention Against Torture, which would bar refoulement even without a
grant of asylum.29
In its conclusions of fact and law, both American and Cuban, the INS determined that
only Elidn's father had legal authority to speak for him on immigration matters and that
Lizaro GonzSilez and his attorneys had no legal basis for doing so."0 With regard to the
question of the circumstances underwhich the child's admission and asylum interests ought
to be considered apart from the wishes of his sole surviving parent, it determined both that
Eliin's father had no interest or vulnerability that conflicted with his ability to represent the
child's immigration interests," and that, after a close evaluation of all available testimony,
the father was able to convey his own true desires and intentions. Finally, the INS concluded
that although Elidn certainly had the right, he did not have the capacity at his tender age
to seek asylum on his own behalf, and that "[s]ince there is no objective basis to believe that
Eliin is at risk for persecution or torture, the INS should not accept his asylum application
against the express wishes of his father." 2
Based on these determinations, the INS on January 5 rejected and returned the two
asylum applications to the attorneys hired through Ldzaro Gonzilez and purporting to
represent Eliin."3 Those attorneys then asked Attorney General Reno to overturn the
decision of the INS commissioner. OnJanuary 12, the attorney general issued a letter ruling
upholding the INS. That letter, which rejected any role for the state family court, also
invited L~zaro Gonzdlez to litigate the issue in federal court.3 4 OnJanuary 19, the plaintiffs
' See Doris Meissner, INS Decision in the Elian Gonzalez Case (Jan. 5, 2000) <http://wivw.ins.usdoj.gov/
graphics/publicaffairs/statements/Elian.htm>.
Cooper memorandum supra note 15, in Defendants' Notice of Filing, supra note 15, at 17.
Id.; see Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1173.
50 See Gonzglez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1173-75.
s' See id. at 1174-75.32 Cooper memorandum, supra note 15, in Defendants' Notice of Filing, supra note 15, at 17. The INS found
both Cuban and Florida law clear on the question of assessing a father's authority to speak for a young child, even
one born out of wedlock. In reHosseinian, Interim Decision 3030 (B.I.A. 1987), confirmed that each relationship
is to be assessed under the law of the jurisdiction where it arose.
Among the INS concerns was the potential harm being done tojuan Miguel by the protracted separation from
his son. Since the INS found no basis to question the father's parental rights, prolonged separation of father and
son might well constitute the kind of interference with parental rights that may not be undertaken absent clear
and convincing evidence of a basis to terminate those rights. SeeCooper memorandum, supra note 15, in Defen-
dants' Notice of Filing, supra note 15, at 13 (citing Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment")).
All aliens present in the United States enjoy the right to apply for asylum. Yet, in the case of children, parents
have the right to "participate in all immigration matters regarding their child." Id. at 12 (quoting Polovchak v.
Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985)). At age six, Elin was well below the minimum age at which he might be
"competent to affirm" the contents of his asylum application. Id at 14. Therefore, following its long-standing INS
Children's Guidelines, as well as the guidelines set forth by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2d ed. 1992), INS adjudicators "will have
to evaluate the claim based on all objective evidence available," id. at para. 219. See Cooper memorandum, supra
note 15, in Defendants' Notice of Filing, supra note 15, at 14. In this case the INS found no objective evidence to
support the claim that Eliin would face persecution in Cuba.
" OnJanuary 5, 2000, a detailed letter explaining its process and decision was sent by INS Executive Associate
Commissioner for Field Operations Michael Pearson to attorneys Roger Bernstein and Spencer Eig. On January
6,James Burzynski, Director of the INS's Texas Service Center, returned the actual applications to lead attorney
Roger Bernstein together with a summary letter and a copy of Pearson's letter. See Complaint, Gonz~lez district
court decision, supra note 1, Ex. A (No. 00-206-CV-MOORE); Gonzflez district court decision, supra note 1, at
1173-74.
" See Reno letter, supra note 23. Also onJanuary 12, the third asylum application, signed by IAzaro alone, was
submitted. According to the Miami attorneys, this new application wasjustified on the basis ofJudge Rodriguez's
"temporary protective order" giving Lfzaro custody over Eliin. See supra notes 17, 23. This third and last
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filed suit in the federal district court in Miami, "alleging that the INS lacked the authority
to reject the asylum applications and was required-by federal statutes and regulations-to
accept and adjudicate" them.35 The INS responded with a motion to dismiss or an alter-
native motion for summaryjudgment.
As an initial matter, the district court determined, contrary to the argument of the INS,
that it did have limited subject matterjurisdiction to consider the complaint and that the
plaintiff enjoyed standing to bring the complaint and was a real party in interest for the
purpose of this action. 6 Although Elidn hirhself did not have the requisite capacity to sue,
Lizaro was "a sufficient next friend exclusively for the purposes of bringing the instant
action" on his behalf." The district court found that there was no "'clear and convincing
evidence' that Congress intended to preclude [udicial] review" of the processing of asylum
applications.' Likewise, Eli~n was found to meet the minimum requirements for standing
to sue. And though Eli~in did not, because of his age, have the capacity to bring suit himself,
his great-uncle L~izaro, his "self-appointed 'next friend,' 39 did meet the Eleventh Circuit's
requirements for "nextfriend" status-under Rule 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure-to pursue this action.' Notwithstanding the Miami relatives' victory on those issues,
the court went on to reject the substance of their complaint.
Citing the classic plenary power cases, the district court found that there had been no
constitutional due process violations in the INS's refusal to process an admission or asylum
application on Elid.n's behalf. "An alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests
a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application," only those rights
given by the statute in question.4 1 The only remaining question, therefore, was whether the
INS had exceeded its authority in interpreting the statute as it did in Eli n 's case.
For the district court, the dispositive question, as it would be for the court of appeals,' was:
Did the Attorney General have the authority to determine that, in light of the express
contrary wishes of Plaintiff's father, an application filed by someone else on six-year-old
Plaintiff's behalf did not require adjudication on its merits? After careful consideration,
the Court finds that the Attorney General's determination is controlling, conclusive, not
manifestly contrary to law, and not an abuse of her congressionally delegated discretion.'
application was rejected and returned upon receipt. See Letter from James Burzynski, Director of INS Texas
Service Center, to Spencer Eig, Roger Bernstein, and Linda Osberg-Braun (Jan. 13,2000), in Defendants' Notice
of Filing, supra note 15, at 317; Gonz,1ez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1175.
" Gonz,1ez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1175. The case w-as initially assigned randomly to Senior
JudgeJames King, who recused himself because of a conflict involving his son and the plaintiffs. The case was then
randomly reassigned to SeniorJudge William Hoeveler, who suffered a stroke shortly after a second preliminary
hearing. The chiefjudge of the district then held the case for one additional hearing, after which it was assigned
to Judge K. Michael Moore, who rendered thejudgment in the case. Id. at 1170 n.1. The assignment ofjudges in
the state court had, in the interim, come under skeptical scrutiny locally.
See id. at 1175-76.
37 Id. at 1176.
' See id. at 1176-79 (citing and quoting (at 1176) Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. McCorp Fin.,
Inc., 502 U.S. 32,44 (1991), and also (at 1177-78) Reno v. Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471 (1999)).
" Id. at 1184.
4 The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) "next friend" status is found inFordv. Haley, 195
F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir. 1999). The district court was strained to find justification for a next friend when a
competent parent opposed such recognition, and reached back to Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 33 U.S.
128, 144 (1834). See GonzJez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1185.
41 GonzSlez district court decision, supranote 1, at 1188 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)).
The Eleventh Circuit has been one of the most adamant that "a constitutionally protected interest cannot arise
from relief that the executive exercises" on a discretionary basis, Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1300 (11th Cir.
1999), and thatadmission issues "are notwithin the protection of the FifthAmendment,"Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d
957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)).
42 See Gonzlez appeal, supra note 3, at 1346-47.
, Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1188. The court seemed to draw its particular formulation
from 8 U.S.C. §1252 (b) (4) (D), which provides that "the Attorney General's discretionaryjudgment whether to
grant relief under [Section 1158(a), the asylum provisions in Section 208 of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act] shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion." Id. at 1189.
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The attorney general's finding, as communicated in herJanuary letters, that Eliin was in-
competent or lacked capacity to exercise the right to apply for asylum against his father's
wishes was a controlling legal determination that, under the given facts, ought to enjoy a
presumption ofjudicial deference.
As an alternative basis for considering the attorney general's interpretation of Section
208,' the district court turned to the jurisprudence of deference to administrative agency
decision making-the chief basis on which the court of appeals rested its later affirmance.
Both the trial court and the appeals court adverted to the now well known Chevron process
and standard:45
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.46
Since the various provisions and paragraphs relevant to the Section 208 asylum provisions
must be read together, it cannot be the case that Congress would provide a standard of
review for the INS's discretionaryjudgment if it did not intend for the agency to exercise
discretion where Congress itself did not mandate exceptions or exclusions-as, in fact, it
had chosen to do elsewhere in Section 208."7
The court of appeals agreed with the above analysis and found that the INS had not
abused its discretion in making a series ofjudgments and determinations, each one ofwhich
was reasonable and within its purview. To begin with, "we cannot say that the foundation of
the [INS] policy-the INS determination that six-year-old children necessarily lack sufficient
capacity to assert, on their own, an asylum claim-is unreasonable."4 That the person ordi-
narily representing such children is a parent "also comes within the range of reasonable
choices," particularly since "INS officials seem to have taken account of the relevant, com-
peting policy interests."49 Hence, the court wrote that "we cannot conclude that the policy's
stress on the parent-child relationship is unreasonable.""
At the same time, INS policies do recognize that conflicts of interest or "special circum-
stances may exist that render a parent an inappropriate representative for the child" and
that in such instances those policies "permit other persons, besides a parent, to speak for
the child in immigration matters.""1 For the court, this particular policy neither frustrated
nor undermined congressional intent. Unlike the district court, which had left the particu-
larly disfavored status of Cuba aside, the court of appeals did worry that the INS had found
that a parent's living "in a communist-totalitarian state is no special circumstance, sufficient
44 See supra note 43.
" See Gonzlez district court decision, supranote 1, at 1190; Gonz4ez appeal, supranote 3, at 1348-49 (quoting
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Both courts also cited and
quoted INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999), with the district court, supra note 1, at 1191, quoting the
position that "judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context
[']where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, [']"
Aguirre-Aguirmr 526 U.S. at 425.4 Gonzlez district court decision, supra note 1, at 1190 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
47 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
"GonzAez appeal, supra note 3, at 1351. The court added in afootnote, id, atn.18, that, "we do not think that the
INS, as a matter of law, must individually assess each child's mental capacity" rather than looking at his or her age.
49 Id. at 1351.
'0 Id. at 1352.
" Id. Sample circumstances thatwould bringabout this state of affairs are noted in the court's footnote 21, supra
note 5.
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in and of itself, tojustify the consideration of a six-year-old's asylum claim (presented by a
relative in this country) against the wishes of a non-resident parent."5 2
Judge Edmondson went on to aver that "some reasonable people might say that a child
in the United States inherently has a substantial conflict of interest with a parent residing
in a totalitarian state when that parent-even when he is not coerced-demands that the
child leave this country to return ... ."" Nonetheless, the INS did not ignore the issue and
had an established policy, and "we cannot properly conclude that the INS policy is totally
unreasonable," particularly since it does take "account of the possibility of government
coercion," such as that which could be "directed at an individual parent."5 4 The court also
briefly observed that the policy touches upon foreign affairs where the executive branch,
acting pursuant to a congressional grant of authority, is entitled to maximum deference.55
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the application of the INS's policy to this
plaintiff was, like the policy itself, reasonable and not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion."
The handling of Elid2n's case comported with the rules and policies adopted by the INS
generally, including both the treatment of Elidn's purported asylum application as void and
the refusal to accept the applications filed by Lzaro. The INS's investigation, including the
interviews ofJuan Miguel and determinations of his veracity, had been thorough.57 Likewise,
the court found that the INS's negative "preliminary assessment of the merits" of Elidn's
asylum claim, while perhaps (or perhaps not) a "consideration" of that claim within the
meaning of the statute, was a "rough look at the potential merits" that constituted "a
legitimate part of deciding whether (Juan Miguel] had a substantial conflict of interest with
[Eliin] about asylum that would disqualify the father from representing" his son.5
In sum, the choices and decisions "that the INS made in this case are choices about which
reasonable people," including a court persuaded of Cuba's "totalitarian" nature, "can dis-
agree. Still, the choices were not unreasonable, not capricious, and not arbitrary, but were
reasoned and reasonable."5 9
The prosaic, if not mundane, opinion of the Eleventh Circuit-well known for being con-
sistently conservative in immigration matters-contrasted sharply with the high-intensity
politics surrounding the case. Some members of Congress rarely associated with liberal
immigration policies sought to make a citizen, or at least permanent resident, of an anti-
Castro poster boy. Some conservative publicists and thinkers-usually adamant in defense
of the family and parental rights-felt it essential that Elidn be taken from his father and
raised in the United States. For the ancien regime exiles from pre-Castro Cuba, as well as
2 Gonzlez appeal, supra note 3, at 1353. The increasingly antique phrase "communist-totalitarian" was the
court's own. The court cited U.S. Dept. ofState's CouNTRYREPORTs ONHUMANRIGHTSPRACTICESFOR1999 (Joint
Comm. Print 2000), obtainabLff om<http://vvv.state.gov/ww/global/humanl_rights/99hrp-index.html>, to the
effect that the Cuban government in 1999 continued "to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its citi-
zens." Gonziez appeal, supra note 3, at 1353.
" Gonzilez appeal, supra note 3, at 1353. It is not clear whether this comment was framed to emphasize that
the case is aboutjudicial deference or whether it reflects, instead, the court's orJudge Edmondson's own view.
54 id
5 See id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). In this connection, the court
seemed to worry that a per se rule that "no parent living in a totalitarian state has sufficient liberty to represent
and to serve the true, best interests of his own child in the United States"-exactly the position of the plaintiffs and
the Cuban-American exile leadership-would cause chaos in the area of foreign affairs. Id at 1353-54.
See id at 1354.
See id. at 1354-55.
Id. at 1355 n.24. Though Eli n might face "education and indoctrination" in Cuba, those things were not
"synonymous with 'persecution,'" i& at1355, seeid. at 1355-56. "The INS's estimate" of the asylum applications-as
.not strong on their merits-is not clearly inaccurate." Id
'9 Id. at 1356.
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for parts of a younger generation of Cuban-American politicians, the Elidn case became a
cause c6l6bre. It remains to be seen whether the case also proves to be awatershed, marking
the waning power of an influential interest group.
At the very least, the opponents of Eli6.n's return, while insistent on the lack of a free legal
order in Cuba, proved less than committed to the "rule of law" in Florida. As noted,' Eliin's
temporary parole into the country in November left him, as is always the case for "parolees,"
in the exclusive custody of the U.S. attorney general, who chose for her own emergent and
freely revocable reasons, to lodge the boy with local relatives. Rebuffing the attorney
general's various efforts throughout the spring to arrange reunification of Eli~n with his
father, the plaintiffs and their supporters-after months of creating a heated atmo-
sphere-forced a showdown with the INS byignoring its demands that Elidn be turned over.
Acting on the basis of a federal search warrant and on the quite plausible theory that Elidn's
relatives, by refusing to adhere to the conditions of his parole, had become kidnappers
involved in an ongoing crime,61 the INS in the early morning of April 22 raided the home
of Lizaro Gonzilez and removed Elidn.
Elidn was quickly reunited with his father and the rest of his family in Washington
pending the outcome of the litigation' while the seizure of Eliin ignited a deep sense of
outrage and betrayal among those committed to the cause of his asylum. Eli.n and his
father, along with his new mother and baby brother, left for Cuba within hours after the
U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for awrit of certiorari. Itis quite likely that this case
will be best remembered, not for the evolution of asylum or administrative discretion
doctrine, but rather for the political passions and brazen local disrespect for the rule of law
that it unloosened. 5
DAVID ABRAHAM
University of Miami School of Law
o See supra note 14 and accompanying text.61 In successfully applying for a search and seizure warrant under Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Mary Rodriguez, an INS senior special agent, affirmed on behalf of the government that Elifin, his
parole havingbeen revoked,was nowalso being"unlawfiflly restrained" atLIzaro's home. Specifically, heraffidavit
swore that:
11. OnApril 14,2000 Michael Pearson, INS Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations sent
a letter to Lazaro Gonzalez to make clear that Elian's parole into his care was revoked at 2:00 pm, Thursday
April 13, 2000 ....
12 .... Lazaro Gonzalez has refused to return physical custody of Elian to the INS, as ordered by the INS....
Lazaro Gonzalez has no claim of right to custody based on the now-dismissed state court proceeding. In the
absence of legal authority from the INS to retain custody of Elian, or the consent of Elian's father[,] ... Lazaro
Gonzalez is unlawfully restraining Elian Gonzalez.
15. Based on this information, I have probable cause to believe that Elian Gonzalez is being unlawfully
restrained... at the Lazaro Gonzalez family residence.
Affidavit of MaryA. Rodriguez 5-7, App. to Robert L. Dub6 (Magis.J., S.D. Fla.) for Search and Seizure Warrant
(Apr. 21, 2000).62 After his arrival in the United States, Juan Miguel had been permitted to become an intervenor in the
litigation then before the circuit court.
' See, e.g., Rick Bragg, "Stand over Cuban Highlights a Virtual Secession of Miami," N.Y. TiEs, Apr. 1, 2000,
atAl.
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